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I. INTRODUCTION
In muiti-agent systems, agents need different resources to fulfill their tasks, while the units of resources that can be allocated are usually limited. How can the limited resources be allocated to different agents effectively and efficiently, and maintain the fairness at the same time? To allocate the resources through auctions is a very promising way.
In many auctions, a bidder's valuation for a combination of resources is not the arithmetic sum of the individual resource' valuations -it can be more or less. This is often the case, for exampie, in bandwidth auctions [ 11, transportation exchanges auctions [2] , and airport landing slots auctions [3], and so on.
In traditional auctions, the resources are auctioned sequentially [4] . In this case, if an agent wants to obtain a combination of the auctioned resources, it has to estimate which other resource it will receive in other auctions, which is heavily relied on how other agents will bid. Such an estimation or look-ahead is uncertainty due to incomplete information about other bidders. This leads to inefficient allocation of resources [lOJ.
Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome these deficiencies. In a combinatorial auction, bidders may submit bids on combinations of resources. This allows the bidders to express complemen tarities between resources instead of speculating the valuation of a resource with the impact of possibly getting other complementary resource. Due to above advantages, the combinatorial auctions mechanism has been applied in the task allocation, planning and time scheduling in multi-agent systems where the items to be allocated are
In some combinatorial auctions, the seller agents have a reserve price for each type of resource, while they have multiple units of each kind of resources for sale. To tackle this kind of combinatorial auctions, a new algorithm was deveIoped based on the existing branch on bids search algorithm for combinatorial auctions. The experimental results indicate that our algorithm can find the optimal solution efficiently when the number of bids is not too big. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I1 describes the general winner determination problem. The winner determination issue in multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve prices is outlined in Section 111. The algorithm for solving the problem is presented in Section IV. A new heuristic function with experimental results is given in Section V. Section VI concludes this paper.
11. THE WINNER DETERMINATION PROBLEM In the first-price sealed-auctions, the winner determination is very easy. Auctioneer agents only need to pick out the maximum price from bids for each resource. In a combinatorial auction, bidders may submit bids on combinations of resources. Winner determination problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions is much more complex. Winner determination of combinatorial auctions can be described as follows:
The auctioneer agent has a set of resources, R = {RI, R2, ..., R,}, to sell, and buyers submit a set of bids,
where Sj R is a nonempty set of resources and pj 2 0 is the price offered for this set of resources. The winner determination problem is to label the bids as winning (zj = 1) or losing (xj = 0) so as to maximize the auctioneer's revenue under the constraint that each resource can be allocated to at most one bidder:
It is hard to get an optimal solution for this problem: it is equivalent to the weighted set packing -a well-known NP-complete problem [5]. Much effort has been put on this problem. Among all the approaches, the following three are typical:
restricting the bundles on which bids can be submitted so that the remaining problem can be solved optimally and provably fast 171.
designing algorithms that are provably fast but fail to find an optimal (or even close to optimal) solution to some problem instances [6] [231. designing algorithms that provably find an optimal solution but are slow on some problem instances The first approach suffers from similar economic ineficiencies and exposure problems as non-combinatorial auctions because the bidders might not be allowed to bid on the bundles they desire. The second approach suffers from wasting economic efficiency whenever a suboptimat solution is settled on (and because the winner determination problem is inapproximable, no fast algorithm can guarantee that its solution is even close to optimal). Furthermore, suboptimal winner determination generally compromises the incentive properties of the auction. Due to these reasons, we focus on the third approach with the understanding that on some problem instances, any algorithm with this approach wit1 take a longer time.
Following the third approach, Sandholm et [2 11 . In a MUCARPC, if auctioneer agents just consider how to find the maximum revenue without considering the reserve price of each resource, it is very likely that the following case will occur:
Assume resources x and y will be auctioned, qz and qv are the numbers of units of x and y for sale, respectively. In this example, there are 2 units for each resource. There are two bids in the auction:
B~ =< 5500, ( o~,~~v~,~) >, B~ =< 3 6 0 0 , (~~,~,~~,~) > Where qf,l = 2, qV,1 = 1, qr,2 = 1, qu,z = 2, the reserve prices of x and y are: z = $2400, y = $400. In the MUCA algorithms which do not consider reserve prices, bid B1 will be the winner for the higher bid price. However, if we take reserve prices into consideration, B1 will bring in profits of $300, which is less than the profits Bz bring in ($400). So choosing Bz as the winner could bring the auctioneer agent greater profits.
With these observations in mind, to maximize auctioneer agents' profits in MUCARPC, we must modify existing algorithms for MUCA.
Some literature in economy provides formalization descriptions for MUCARPC [22] , whereas no detailed algorithms for solving the winner determination problem were reported. In the next section, we will present the MUCARPC algorithm we developed to solve the WDP in MUCARPC. MUCARPC algorithm incorporates many of the techniques proposed in BOB algorithm [13]. Since Sandholm has proved that BOB can find optimal solution accurately, we have reasons to believe that the MUCARPC algorithm can also find optimal solution.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF MUCARPC ALGORITHM
The skeleton of our algorithm is a depth-first branch-andbound tree search that branches on bids. The set of bids that are labeled winning OR the path to the current search node is called IN, and the set of bids that are winning in the best allocation found so far is I N * . Let f ' be the value of the best solution found so far. Each bid, Bj , has an exclusion count, e j , that stores how many times B j has been excluded by bids on the path, R' is the set of resources that are still un-allocated, and g is the profits from the bids with xj = 1 on the search path so far. h is the total profits of the bids that can be added in the search tree at current search node. l?i is the tally being kept for resource i , which denoting the number of units allocated where e j = 0 indicating that bid Bj has not been excluded at current search node. gi-I'i denotes the un-allocated number of units of resource i at current search node. The key idea of this heuristic function is to calculate the maximum revenue value from the un-allocated resources. Instinctively, we can have a heuristic function for our proposed algorithm as follows:
h2 is the sum of the theoretic maximum profits from the un-allocated resources. To verify the feasibility of h2 for MUCARPC algorithm, experiments were carried out for MUCARPC algorithm with and without heuristic function h~,
The experiments were conducted under the same hardware and software environment (IBM Thinkpad T22 XOOMHz with 256MB RAM, Windows XP, jdk 1.3.1). For the two algorithms, the same bids were generated and the same preprocessing step was executed. Without loss of generality, the number of units of each resource is randomly chosen from 1 to 100 in the experiments, and the number of units of each resource requiring in each bid is random number from 1 to the number of units of each resource. The execution time for the type of resources is always 50 and the number of bids increases by 50 each run is shown in tree can be reduced with h2, while calculation of hz is very time-consuming. Thus we cannot take ha as the heuristic function for our algorithm.
To this end, a new heuristic function h is developed for MUCARPC algorithm, which calculates the total profits value from the bids that can be added in the search tree at current search node. With the new heuristic function h adding in, the execution time of MUCARPC algorithm can be reduced greatly. The new heuristic function h is described as follows: n The value of h is the upper bound of profits that can gain from current search node. It can be proved as follows:
Proof: Let Bvseaale be the set of bids which can be added in the search tree at current search node, h is the total profits of Buaeable. Let Bbest be the set of bids that can bring in the maximum profit Vb& in the rest search. It is obvious that Bbest 2 Buseable, then &est 5 h holds.
This completes the proof. The heuristic function h can not only reduce search nodes but also cut down execution time of the algorithm due to the less time spending on calculating the value of h. Similar experiments were conducted for MUCARPC with and without h.
From Figures 3 and 4 , it is clear that MUCARPC algorithm with h is always faster, and in many cases dramatically faster. With the heuristic function h, the execution time can be reduced as well as the search nodes. The average execution time of MUCARPC algorithm with h and without is in the proportion of 1 : 2.01 with fixed type of resources; the proportion is 1 : 8.87 with fixed number of bids. The average search nodes for MUCARPC algorithm with and without h is in the proportion of 1 : 2.05 in Figure 3 . In Figure 4 , the 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The combinatorial auctions mechanisms have extensive applications in the resource and task allocation, planning and time scheduling in multi-agent systems. This paper described the winner determination problem of combinatorial auctions at first, and then presented an algorithm for optimal winner determination of multi-unit combinatorial auctions with reserve prices. The algorithm included a new heuristic function h.
With the new heuristic function h, the execution time of our algorithm is reduced greatly* The experimental results show that our algorithm is fast when the number of bids is not too big.
In the future work, we will improve our algorithm so that it can find the optimal solutions when the number of bids is very big.
